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Research on social preferences in economics has by now
amply demonstrated that the welfare of individuals is aﬀected
not only by the goods and services they consume but also by
the position and actions of others with whom they compare
themselves. Most of the literature on social preference focuses
on pro-social behavior where cooperation and other regarding
behavior lead to better socially beneﬁcial outcomes than pre-
dicted by the standard economic model. For example, when
punishment is introduced in public good games, people are will-
ing to punish those that free-ride, even at their own expenses,
and are reluctant to punish those that cooperate (Ertan, Page,
& Putterman, 2009). In trust games, players give substantial
proportion of their money to others with the expectation that
they will get it back even though they have no control on the
decision of the recipients (Cox, 2004). The literature on reci-
procity emphasizes mainly its role in strengthening pro-social
behavior. One of the celebrated books in this area, Henrich
et al. (2004), summarizes results of many experimental games
and ethnographic studies from ﬁfteen small-scale societies in
diﬀerent parts of the world. Themain thrust of this strand of lit-
erature is toward understanding how pro-social behavior helps
overcome social dilemmas and improve social outcomes. 1
In contrast, a growing body of literature focuses on the neg-
ative aspects of social preferences where the destruction of
potential surplus (value) is emphasized. Earlier work by
Kirchsteiger (1994) suggested that envy is an equally plausible
underlying motive as fairness for rejection of oﬀers in the ulti-
matum game. Experimental work suggests that people are will-
ing to devote their resources to decrease the welfare of better-oﬀ
people (Zizzo, 2003; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001) – speciﬁcally, they
are willing to destroy (‘burn’) other people’s earnings at a cost
to themselves. Laboratory experiments also show that subjects
are willing to harm for little reason or no self-interest (Abbink
& Herrmann, 2009, 2011). Experiments conducted in India
show that spiteful preferences – the desire to reduce another’s
material payoﬀ for the mere purpose of increasing one’s relative
payoﬀ – are widespread (Fehr, Hoﬀ, & Kshetramade, 2008).267In contrast to the papers cited above that used experimental
games, research using survey methods also looked at posi-
tional concerns – whether the relative position of people mat-
ters. Some of the papers argue that positional concerns
become important only at higher levels of income; they argue
people in low-income countries are mainly concerned about
their absolute positions rather than their relative standing
compared to others (Akay, Martinsson, & Medhin, 2012;
Clark, Frijters, & Shields, 2008; Frey & Stutzer, 2002). In con-
trast, others found just the opposite. For example, Corazzini,
Esposito, and Majorano (2011) found positional concerns in
fact are higher in developing compared to rich countries.
Other studies in developing countries also show relative posi-
tions matter. A recent study on India (Fontaine & Yamada,
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concerns are important in developing countries. First,
within-caste comparisons reduce well-being; expenditure by
others from the same caste triggers stronger envy than provid-
ing a positive signal about one’s future prospects. Second,
between-caste comparisons have a stronger eﬀect than
within-caste comparisons. Third, high castes’ economic suc-
cesses are detrimental to low castes’ well-being but the reverse
is not true. In a diﬀerent context, a study from Jordan (El-Said
& Harrigan, 2009) found strong envy between the Jordanian
and Palestinian (immigrant) communities – while Jordanians
envy the Palestinians’ dominance in the higher wage private
sector, Palestinians envy the Jordanians because of the latters’
dominance in the public sector. Theesfeld (2004) discusses how
distrust and envy creates a formidable constraint for collective
action required to maintain irrigation in Bulgaria.
This paper mainly falls within the second strand of literature
that focuses on the negative eﬀects of social preferences. To
capture this aspect, we employ a money burning experimental
design (Zizzo, 2003; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001) in rural villages
of Ethiopia, with additional sessions with university students
in an urban area. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that
uses money burning games in a rural setting of a developing
country. Our money burning game has two parts: in the ﬁrst,
an unequal distribution of resources is induced by varying ini-
tial endowments after which participants play a lottery. In the
second round, people are given a chance to use their own
money to decrease (‘burn’) others’ money. In addition to
exploring the existence and variations of money burning behav-
ior, one of the main objectives of this paper is to understand the
underlying motives. Our experimental design provides data for
testing the deeper motives for money burning behavior. In par-
ticular, we test whether inequality aversion and/or reciprocity/
retaliation play a role. There is evidence that players burn
money due to inequality aversion based on absolute income dif-
ferences as suggested by the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model.
The money burning behavior of participants in the game is
likely a reﬂection of similar behavior in reality. Our particular
interest in this regard is to link our experimental results with
real-life agricultural innovations. There aremany anecdotal evi-
dences in a number of countries of sabotaging behavior which
targets better-oﬀ individuals. There is at least a potential case
that this likely discourages entrepreneurship (Schoeck, 1966).
Mui (1995) gives examples from reforming East European
countries and China of how sabotaging may have constrained
the emergence of entrepreneurs. Caplan (2005) discusses the
‘cargo system’ in rural Latin America where successful individ-
uals expected to hold oﬃces are required to self-fund and that
this may result in an informal tax as high as 80%. He notes
how this may discourage innovation and growth. Earlier socio-
logical and psychological work on Ethiopia also emphasizes the
pressure toward conformity and the zero-sum nature of social
interactions in the country (Korten, 1972; Levine, 1965, 1974).
Agricultural innovations are complex processes that are
aﬀected by many factors – there is voluminous theoretical
and empirical literature on agricultural innovations in devel-
oping countries. Feder and Umali (1993) and Sunding and
Zilberman (2001) are good reviews of the literature on agricul-
tural innovations. Ward and Singh (2014) is a recent paper
that relates experimental games with agricultural innovations
in a developing country. 2 Providing an exhaustive review of
the literature is beyond this paper but highlighting some recent
ﬁndings on agricultural innovations on Ethiopia is instructive.
Most farmers in rural Ethiopia live in a highly unpredictable
environment facing such signiﬁcant environmental shocks
like draught; smoothing consumption across time is a realchallenge. Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) showed lower con-
sumption due to harvest failure is an important constraint in
fertilizer adoption, implying that consumption smoothing is
an important determinant of innovation. The inﬂuence of social
networks in encouraging the spread of information and knowl-
edge and consequently enhancing innovations has been empha-
sized in the recent literature. Krishnan and Patnam (2013)
compared learning from government extension agents and
from neighbors in the adoption of fertilizer and improved seeds
in Ethiopia. They found that, while the initial impact of exten-
sion agents was high, the eﬀect wore oﬀ after some time, in con-
trast to learning from neighbors underlining the importance of
social networks. Abebe, Bijman, Pascucci, and Omta (2013)
emphasized the market-related quality attributes in the choice
of new crops such as improved variety potatoes in Ethiopia –
the spread of improved variety potato was constrained by the
preference of people for the taste of the local variety.
The growing empirical literature increasingly shows the
complex nature of agricultural innovations. Yet the role of
social preferences in agricultural innovations is still not well-
understood. This paper contributes toward this by linking
behavior observed in experimental games with real-life agricul-
tural innovations. For that purpose, this project deliberately
uses subjects that were previously covered by a panel house-
hold survey to utilize already available data on agricultural
innovations. Multi-level mixed eﬀects models that control
for village- and session-level random eﬀects are used to iden-
tify the link between agricultural innovations and money
burning behavior observed in the experimental games. The
empirical results show a robust negative correlation between
social money burning and agricultural innovations – observed
agricultural innovations as captured by an independent previ-
ous survey are lower in communities with high rates of money
burning. We further use information on three innovations –
fertilizer, improved seeds, and rain water harvesting – on
which the current research collected data and also found
robust and negative correlation between social money burning
rates and agricultural innovations. These results imply that the
money burning behavior captured by the game in the labora-
tory most likely captures an unobservable social preference
that is inimical to real-life agricultural innovations. The link
created between the behavior of participants in the game
and their real-life agricultural innovations is the other impor-
tant contribution of this paper. This is supported by qualita-
tive data coming from sociological reports prepared as part
of our project, for example with one of the farmers surveyed
reporting that “using better technology might be good in terms
of increasing yields. But it also increases the number of ene-
mies one might have. You will be targeted by enemies includ-
ing wild animals and those who possess the power of the evil
eye; they will aﬀect your cattle’s fertility as well as the fertility
of the soil permanently” (Dessalegn, 2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the experimental design and the inequality aversion
models predictions. While results are discussed in Section 3,
Section 4 provides the conclusions.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND INEQUALITY
AVERSION MODELS PREDICTIONS
(a) Design
Thirty individuals participate in a session of the experimen-
tal game. At the start, players are randomly given large (Birr 3
15) or small (Birr 7) amounts of money to induce inequality.
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Players know whether they are high- or low-income players.
Then players can use any amount of their initial endowment
to buy a more than actuarially fair lottery with a 50% chance
of winning three times the amount invested. The thirty players
are divided into ﬁve groups with six players in each group,
equally divided into high- and low-income players. Anonymity
within each group is strictly maintained, i.e., even though the
thirty participants in a session can see each other, with whom
they are matched in a group is kept unknown.
After the lottery game, players are informed of what
amounts of money the other ﬁve members of their group ini-
tially received, saved, and how much they have won from
the lottery. All six members of a group are then asked how
much of the money of others in their group they would like
to ‘burn’; each player makes ﬁve money burning decisions
related to each of the other ﬁve members of the group. Players
cannot burn their own money. They have to pay, however, for
burning the money of others; the price of money burning is
one tenth of the amount to burn (for example, a player has
to pay Birr 1 to decrease another’s money by Birr 10). The
money burning is separately done for ‘safe’ (that is,
un-invested) money and lottery winnings in order to capture
potential heterogeneity.
After eliciting the money burning decisions, a random dicta-
tor design is used to determine the actual money to be burnt.
Even though the amounts the six players want to burn from
the money of the other ﬁve are recorded, only the choice of
one is implemented after random selection. 4 Subjects learn
about the outcome of the game before moving to the next one.
The game is repeated three times (three stages). Two sessions
of 30 subjects were run in each of the four rural villages (a total
of 240 players). In each stage subjects were randomly matched
with their group members (variable groups). Two
variable group sessions were also conducted at Addis Ababa
University with 60 students. Additional two sessions in
which the same subjects were matched in the three stages (ﬁxed
groups) were run with 60 students at the university. 5
At the end of the experiment, participants went home with
all the money accumulated over the three stages plus a partic-
ipation fee of Birr 40. The mean payment, including the partic-
ipation fees, was around Birr 80, i.e., approximately U.S. $10
or around 4 days of wages for unskilled labor.
(b) Inequality aversion model predictions
Economists increasingly recognize that people care about
their relative position in addition to their own payoﬀ. The mod-
els of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) are two popular models that formalize this concern spe-
ciﬁcally concentrating on inequality aversion. In the inequality
aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), players dislike
inequality whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous to
them; richer people feel ‘guilt’ and poorer people suﬀer from
‘envy’ (this is the reason why the Fehr–Schmidt model is some-
times referred to as the ‘guilt/envy’ model). Even though peo-
ple can feel ‘guilt’ or ‘envy’ depending on their relative
position, the latter motive is stronger than the former – being
comparatively rich is better than being comparatively poor.
The Fehr–Schmidt utility function has the following form:
UiðxÞ ¼ xi  ai 1n 1
X
j–i
max xj  xi; 0
 
 bi
1
n 1
X
j–i
max xi  xj; 0
  ð1ÞHere xi denotes monetary payoﬀ of player i and n represents
the number of players. The second term in the utility function
measures the loss of utility from disadvantageous inequality
(‘envy’) and the third from advantageous inequality (‘guilt’).
The assumption that the former is greater than the latter
implies bi 6 ai (0 6 bi < 1).
In contrast, the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) inequality
aversion model focuses on the relative position of the individ-
ual compared to the mean payoﬀ of other players; note in the
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, players focus on absolute dif-
ferences. A simpliﬁed version of the Bolton–Ockenfels utility
function has the following form (Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012):
Ui ¼ U xi; xiX
xj=n 1
0
@
1
A where j–i ð2Þ
Here, in addition to the absolute value of their earnings, play-
ers compare their payoﬀ with the average payoﬀ of others. In
this model, players prefer a payoﬀ that is nearer to the aver-
age.
The prediction from these two models of inequality aversion
can be directly tested in a multivariate regression framework
using our money burning experimental data. To test the
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, we computed the diﬀerence
between a player’s payoﬀ to that of each of the ﬁve members
of his/her group within which money burning happens. Note
that this variable is negative for players with lower payoﬀ
and positive for those with higher payoﬀ – hence, the Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) model predicts that money burning should
fall with higher values of this variable, other things being
equal. To test the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model, we com-
puted the ratio of the payoﬀ of a player to the average payoﬀ
of the other ﬁve players in the money burning group. Note
that this ratio will be less (greater) than one if the player’s pay-
oﬀ is lower (higher) than the average payoﬀ of the other group
members. Hence, the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model
predicts money burning will fall with higher values of this
ratio, other things being equal. 6
The next section presents the main experimental results.
Details on data collection are presented in the Appendix.3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we ﬁrst provide a general overview of the
results. We then test for diﬀerent underlying motives for
money burning and examine the relationship between money
burning rates and real-life agricultural innovations.
(a) General overview
Money burning rates are deﬁned as the amounts of money
that subjects burn out of the total money available to burn
(i.e., from each of the other players) in percentage terms.
Table 1 shows the money burning rates for diﬀerent groups
and survey sites. Note that in each stage players make ﬁve pairs
of money burning decisions (from safe money and lottery
winnings) 7; for 360 players and for three stages, this consti-
tutes 5,400 pairs of money burning decisions. The ﬁgures pro-
vided in the ﬁrst panel of Table 1 are related to these
disaggregated money burning decisions. Using these disaggre-
gated ﬁgures, the overall mean burning rate is around 8% and
the corresponding median is zero; in 56% of the cases, players
burned nothing even when there is some money to burn (in 280
cases there was no money to burn since players have used all
their money on lottery and lost). That said, the maximum
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Max Std. dev.
Total money burning rates (%) (disaggregated money burning decisions)
From total payoﬀ 8.16 0 100.00 14.02
From safe money 7.93 0 100.00 15.45
From lottery winnings 9.02 0 100.00 15.78
Total money burning rates (%) (for individual players)
From total payoﬀ 8.24 6.56 64.18 8.85
From safe money 8.37 5.92 87.21 10.72
From lottery winnings 8.57 5.56 65.22 10.32
Total money burning rates (%)
Stage 1 11.93 8.48 100.00 14.28
Stage 2 7.67 4.55 69.62 10.52
Stage 3 5.98 2.97 50.00 8.25
Total burning (Birr)
Stage 1 7.31 5.00 57.00 8.70
Stage 2 4.93 3.00 59.00 7.17
Stage 3 4.09 2.00 35.00 5.72
Overall investment rate (%) 37.80 33.33 100.00 28.18
Percentile Centile 95% conf. interval
Percentiles of total money burning rates (%) (for individual players)
10 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 0.04 0.00 1.19
30 2.58 1.44 3.44
40 4.50 3.47 5.29
50 6.56 5.26 7.48
60 8.47 7.47 9.33
70 10.26 9.39 11.40
80 12.90 11.88 15.00
90 18.68 16.73 22.72
100 64.18 64.18 64.18
Rural Addis Ababa
Variable groups Fixed groups Variable groups
Mean money burning rates (%) (urban–rural and ﬁxed and variable groups)
From un-invested earnings 7.88 12.03 4.71
From lottery earnings 9.16 12.42 5.80
Overall 8.27 11.89 5.47
Mean investment rates on lottery (%) 28.68 49.13 62.93
Male (%) 65.00 93.33 88.33
Age (years) 46.24 21.51 21.35
No education (%) 49.58 0.00 0.00
270 WORLD DEVELOPMENTburning rates of 100% (where players burn all available money)
and the relatively high standard deviations indicate that there
are signiﬁcant numbers of high money burning rates.
The second and third sets of money burning rates in Table 1
are aggregated by individual players. Even though in the
majority of separate money burning decisions, players did
not burn anything (as we have seen above), the median ﬁgures
are now signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero when we look at the
average decisions of players; there are only 72 players from
360 who did not burn anything in all the three stages. This
is also true if the player averages are disaggregated by stages.
The percentile distribution of money burning rates given in the
middle of Table 1 indicates the wide dispersion. Even though
the average money burning rate is about 8%, around 20% of
the players on the average burnt more than 18%. The histo-
grams in Figure 1 show the distribution of money burning
rates and absolute amounts of money burnt.
No signiﬁcant diﬀerences in money burning rates between
safe money and lottery winnings are observed. The moneyburning rates and the total money burnt decrease in subse-
quent stages of the game. The relatively low money burning
coupled with the random dictator design may have played a
role here; when people are not burnt in the ﬁrst stage, they
may tend to burn less in subsequent stages.
Average money burning rates in Addis Ababa are about 12%
with ﬁxed and about half as much with variable groups, with
the rural rates in-between. There is more money burning within
ﬁxed than variable groups, as conﬁrmed by a Mann–Whitney
test on the Addis Ababa sample (P = 0.05). 8 On the other
hand, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in money burning rates
between variable groups in Addis Ababa and rural villages.
Result 1. Money burning rates are higher with ﬁxed groups
than with variable groups.
Players invest around 38% of their endowment on the lottery
on average. This average ﬁgure hides the signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in investment rates between the university sample and the farm-
ers in rural areas; while average investment rate of the former is
56% that of the latter is only 29%. The spread of investment
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Figure 1. Histograms of money burning rates (upper panel) and amount of money burning by sites (lower panel) (mean at player level for all three stages).
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clearly illustrated by the histograms in Figure 2.
The above ﬁgures imply that rural subjects are more risk
averse than Addis Ababa students, as revealed by their choices
to invest less in the lottery (Mann–Whitney P < 0.001). We
suspect a combination of three factors likely explains this dif-
ference. First, there is evidence that risk aversion increases
with age (e.g., Albert & Duﬀy, 2012); the average age of the
rural sample is around 46 years with the corresponding ﬁgure
for the students being 21 (look at Table 1). Second, there is
evidence that risk aversion falls with increases in cognitive
ability (e.g., Dohmen, Falk, Huﬀman, & Sunde, 2010). Partic-
ularly, in our case the comparison is between farmers who are
largely uneducated (50% of whom are without any education)
and students that are selected through highly competitive
academic entrance procedures for their university education.Third, there is evidence that females are more risk averse than
males (e.g., Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman, & Meijers, 2009).
In the rural sample, 65% are males; the proportion increases to
90% with university students. The dominance of males in the
university sample is a third potential explanatory factor.
Result 2. Rural subjects are more risk averse.
The next section will shed more light on the possible under-
lying motives for money burning, particularly focusing on
inequality aversion and reciprocity/retaliation.
(b) Money burning, inequality aversion, and reciprocity
To test the two inequality aversion models as described in
Section 2(b), we used the disaggregated experimental game
data. Note that, in each stage, each player is matched with ﬁve
other players and is given information on what amount of
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Figure 2. Histograms of investment rates by sites (all rounds).
272 WORLD DEVELOPMENTmoney they have and is asked how much he/she would like to
burn. In total there are 360 players and with three stages and
ﬁve decisions of money burning for each stage the total num-
ber of observations adds up to 5,400 providing ample degrees
of freedom. The money burning rate, as deﬁned above, is the
percentage of money a player would like to burn from the
total money (safe money plus lottery winning) of another
player in the group at that stage. The money burning rate is
regressed on the above-deﬁned inequality aversion variables,
the total income of the money burner, whether the other
player is a high- or low-income player and location and game
related dummy variables. In a signiﬁcant number of cases,
players decided to burn nothing (money burning rate is zero);
to handle the censoring problem we used panel tobit models
with individual-level random eﬀects. Four variations of the
regressions are reported in Table 2. In the ﬁrst and second
models the absolute income diﬀerence and ratio of own
income to average income of others are entered separately;
in both, game-related variables and location dummies are
included. In the third and fourth regressions, both inequality
aversion variables are included; in the fourth, additional
socio-demographic variables are controlled for.
The coeﬃcients on absolute total income diﬀerences are con-
sistently negative and highly signiﬁcant; in other words, the
higher the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ of a player and other
players, the higher the player burns their money. This supports
the prediction of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequality aver-
sion model. The positive and consistently signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on high-income players also supports inequality aversion;
players tend to burn more money from those that received
higher amounts of initial money.
Result 3. Players burn more money when the absolute dif-
ference between their payoﬀ and the payoﬀ of others
increases – this ﬁnding supports the predictions from
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequality aversion model.
In contrast, all the coeﬃcients on the ratio of own income to
the average income of the others is consistently positive and
highly signiﬁcant. In other words, the data do not support
the prediction from the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model;
when the ratio of own payoﬀ relative to that of other groupmembers increases, players tend to burn more money, exactly
the opposite of the prediction from the model. Part of the rea-
son for this result is most likely related to an income eﬀect.
Note that money burning is a costly mechanism of redistribut-
ing income – players pay one-tenth of the value of the money
they would like to burn. If players with a higher payoﬀ burn
more because they can ‘aﬀord’ to do so (an income eﬀect), it
will make the coeﬃcients positive since the ratio is positively
correlated to the player’s own payoﬀ. This seems to be con-
ﬁrmed by the positive coeﬃcient on the total income of the
money burner in speciﬁcation (1) which becomes no longer
signiﬁcant when the income ratio variable is added. This is
as a consequence of multicollinearity between the two vari-
ables. Hence, in addition to the fact that income of the player
directly enters into the ratio, the signiﬁcance of the regression
coeﬃcients indicate the income ratio variable is partly captur-
ing an income eﬀect. 9 The income eﬀect does not fully explain
the positive coeﬃcient.
Result 4. The data from the money burning game do not
support the prediction of the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
model of inequality aversion.
To summarize, while there is a robust support for the pre-
diction of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, the available
evidence from the data does not support the Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) model. In fact, the coeﬃcients suggest the
opposite of what the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model
predicts.
The other possible motive for money burning is reciprocity/
retaliation. The money burning game used the random dicta-
tor design; from all the money burning decisions made by
the six group members, the decision of only one is randomly
selected and implemented. The actual amount of money burnt
in the previous stage can trigger retaliatory money burning in
the current stage. Particularly, this motive can be stronger in
the ﬁxed groups since the identity of the group members is
kept the same in all stages; in other words, the person who
has burnt your money will still be in your group in the next
stage. But in the case of the variable groups, in every stage
players are matched with other players and if there is a retal-
iatory motive it will of a ‘generalized’ nature; that is, people
Table 2. Absolute and relative inequality aversion: Panel tobit models (individual level random eﬀects)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Absolute total income diﬀerence 0.0036*** 0.0043*** 0.0042***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Ratio of own income to average of others 0.0342*** 0.0519*** 0.0509***
(0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0089)
Total income of money burner 0.0053*** 0.0015 0.0014 0.0016
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010)
High-income player (the other player) 0.0225*** 0.0517*** 0.0163** 0.0175**
(0.0078) (0.0066) (0.0078) (0.0079)
Socio-demographic variables
Male (dummy) 0.0031
(0.0317)
Age (log) 0.0410
(0.0546)
No education (dummy) 0.0088
(0.0342)
Game related variables
Afternoon session 0.0053 0.0094 0.0058 0.0078
(0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0243) (0.0253)
Stage 2 0.0818*** 0.0784*** 0.0809*** 0.0835***
(0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0078)
Stages 3 0.1270*** 0.1138*** 0.1219*** 0.1224***
(0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0082)
Variable groups 0.1384*** 0.1267*** 0.1411*** 0.1385***
(0.0423) (0.0421) (0.0426) (0.0431)
Location dummies (Addis Ababa baseline)
Yetmen 0.0900** 0.0882** 0.1040** 0.1005**
(0.0423) (0.0422) (0.0428) (0.0432)
Terufe Kechema 0.0728* 0.0594 0.0811* 0.0846*
(0.0425) (0.0423) (0.0429) (0.0436)
Imdibir 0.0969** 0.0843** 0.1064** 0.1403**
(0.0423) (0.0421) (0.0427) (0.0560)
Aze Deboa 0.0697 0.0660 0.0820* 0.1087*
(0.0424) (0.0422) (0.0428) (0.0563)
Constant 0.0313 0.0002 0.0407 0.2011
(0.0332) (0.0327) (0.0335) (0.2041)
Sigma_u 0.2149*** 0.2142*** 0.2168*** 0.2177***
(0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0110)
Sigma_e 0.1843*** 0.1834*** 0.1829*** 0.1832***
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Observations 5,121 5,121 5,121 5,031
Number of players 360 360 360 354
Note: The dependent variable in these regressions is the money burning rate, i.e., the ratio of money burnt to total payoﬀ (safe money plus lottery
winnings). Standard errors in parentheses;
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
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burnt their money may no more be in their group.
To test for the potential existence of a retaliatory motive,
money burning rates are regressed on actual money burnt in
the previous stage (lagged actual money burnt). If this motive
is important in money burning, this variable will have a posi-
tive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Note that since there is no
lagged actual money burnt for the ﬁrst stage, the regressions
use data from only the second and third stages (look at Table 3).
In all the four speciﬁcations reported in Table 3, the coeﬃ-
cients on lagged actual money burnt are never signiﬁcant. Par-
ticularly note that in the fourth speciﬁcation we have added an
interactive term between lagged actual money burnt and thedummy variable for variable groups. If retaliation was an
important motive at least in the ﬁxed groups, this interactive
term would have become signiﬁcant; the coeﬃcient is not sig-
niﬁcant. Hence, retaliation does not seem to be an important
motive for money burning also in the ﬁxed group versions
of the game.
Result 5. Reciprocity/retaliation is not an important motive
behind money burning in our experiment. This is true even
if we particularly focus on the ﬁxed groups where the iden-
tity of the members is kept the same across stages of the
game.
So far we looked at the underlying motive for money burn-
ing and found that the data support the prediction of the Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) model which focuses on absolute income
Table 3. Retaliatory motive for money burning: Panel tobit models (individual level random eﬀects)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged actual money burnt 0.0032 0.0007 0.0009 0.0014
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0053)
Lagged actual money burnt*variable group 0.0031
(0.0061)
Total income of money burner 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
High-income player (the other player) 0.0450*** 0.0447*** 0.0456*** 0.0456***
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0078)
Male (dummy) 0.0049 0.0054
(0.0325) (0.0325)
Age (log) 0.0648 0.0641
(0.0561) (0.0561)
No education (dummy) 0.0021 0.0032
(0.0351) (0.0352)
Afternoon session 0.0142 0.0182 0.0316
(0.0248) (0.0258) (0.0440)
Stages 2 0.0295*** 0.0276*** 0.0303
(0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0443)
Variable groups 0.0725* 0.0675 0.0950*
(0.0432) (0.0438) (0.0571)
Yetmen 0.0351 0.0318 0.0504
(0.0435) (0.0441) (0.0577)
Terufe Kechema 0.0292 0.0309 0.0174
(0.0436) (0.0443) (0.0258)
Imdibir 0.0507 0.0956* 0.0275***
(0.0431) (0.0572) (0.0084)
Aze Deboa 0.0132 0.0502 0.0715
(0.0435) (0.0577) (0.0444)
Constant 0.1172*** 0.0994*** 0.3557* 0.3499*
(0.0177) (0.0346) (0.2102) (0.2103)
Sigma_u 0.2135*** 0.2125*** 0.2139*** 0.2137***
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0124)
Sigma_e 0.1500*** 0.1493*** 0.1494*** 0.1493***
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Observations 2,827 2,827 2,772 2,772
Number of players 360 360 354 354
Note: The dependent variable in these regressions is the money burning rate, i.e., the ratio of money burnt to total payoﬀ (safe money plus lottery
winnings). Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
274 WORLD DEVELOPMENTdiﬀerences. In contrast, the inequality aversion model that
focuses on relative income comparison with the average
income of other players as captured by the Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) model is not supported by the data. In addi-
tion, retaliation is not a signiﬁcant motive for money burning.
In the next section, we examine if money burning captured
in the game is related to real-life agricultural innovations.
(c) Agricultural innovations and money burning
One of the main objectives of this research is to understand
how social preferences captured by money burning games are
related to real-life agricultural innovations. We shall examine
these issues ﬁrst by combining the experimental data from the
current project with household data from the Ethiopian Rural
Household Survey (ERHS) 10 and second using additional
data on agricultural innovations collected by the current
research project. The use of two data sets generated by entirelyindependent data generating processes provides credence to
our results. Note that the ﬁrst part of this section uses data
only from rural participants that were covered by the ERHS.
Money burning observed in the experimental game likely
proxies for some unobserved social preference in real life
and agricultural innovation is expected to be aﬀected by these
social preferences through three diﬀerent channels. 11 First,
individual money burning likely captures relevant individual
characteristics correlated to innovation. For example, people
burning others’ money are likely more aggressive and/or com-
petitive and hence we hypothesize that these characteristics
may be correlated to innovative behavior. Second, the money
burning of others (social money burning) is expected to aﬀect
innovation; a farmer in a community with high social money
burning will be discouraged to invest as some of the returns
from investment will be destroyed by others. 12 Third, the
interaction between individual and social money burning is
also an important factor. Even if a positive correlation
SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL CASE STUDY 275between individual money burning and innovation is expected,
if everybody in the community behaves similarly the net eﬀect
may be diﬀerent depending on feedback eﬀects (externality).
Given other determinants, the innovation function can be
presented as follows:
Ihv ¼ f MBRhvh;MBRvhv;MBRhhv MBRvhv=INhv; Ssv; V v
  ð3Þ
In Eqn. (3) the subscripts h and v index households and villages
respectively; in our sample the households are from four vil-
lages hence v runs from 1 to 4. Ihv stands for innovations imple-Table 4. Innovation index (from Ethiopian Rural Household S
(1) ERHS
Innovation index Frequency Percent Cum. Freq.
1 19 12.67 12.67
2 21 14.00 26.67
3 30 20.00 46.67
4 29 19.33 66.00
5 21 14.00 80.00
6 22 14.67 94.67
7 6 4.00 98.67
8 2 1.33 100.00
Total 150 100.00
Table 5. Innovations (ERHS) and money burning: Multi-l
Variables (1)
Investment rates on lottery game 0.0522
(0.6176)
Money burning rate from safe money 0.7805
(1.7274)
Money burning rate from lottery win 0.3017
(1.4215)
Safe money social burning rate for PA
Lottery win social burning rate for PA
Individual*social money burning rates (safe money)
Individual* social money burning rates (lottery win)
Male (dummy)
Age (log)
No education (dummy)
Constant 3.9321***
(0.6375)
Study site var(_cons) 0.1791
(0.3639)
Session var(_cons) 25.7324***
(8.0622)
Var(Residual) 0.2301***
(0.0585)
Observations 150
Number of groups 4
Note: The dependent variable in these regressions is the innovation index com
each subject which took part in the ERHS. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.mented by household h in village v, MBRhv
h and MBRhv
v stand
for individual and social money burning rates and INhv, Ssv
and Vv represent individual-, session-, and village-level eﬀects
that aﬀect innovations. MBRhv
h  MBRhvv stands for the inter-
active term between individual and social money burning rates
included to capture the externality (feedback) eﬀects.
To measure the overall adoption rates of households (Ihv) a
simple innovation index is computed using the ERHS data.
This index captures twelve agricultural innovations; farmers
were asked whether they grow new crops like coﬀee and chat, 13urvey and from the data collected in this research project)
(2) Money burning project
Innovation index Frequency Percent Cum. Freq.
0 42 21.65 21.65
1 57 29.38 51.03
2 76 39.18 90.21
3 19 9.79 100.00
Total 194 100.00
evel regressions (site and session levels random eﬀects)
(2) (3) (4)
0.0602 0.0809 0.1220
(0.6173) (0.6133) (0.6356)
4.5530** 41.0097** 31.7879
(1.9655) (20.4330) (20.2959)
4.0992*** 13.9574 15.3235
(1.5724) (16.1412) (15.5910)
224.4653*** 257.6613*** 250.0944***
(51.5005) (55.5914) (60.4536)
258.0384*** 241.1391*** 222.4717***
(43.7726) (46.9992) (51.1965)
478.5592* 370.9191
(264.1420) (261.1661)
199.7049 219.0262
(181.0975) (174.8396)
0.7638***
(0.2395)
0.2122
(0.3942)
0.0326
(0.2363)
45.4322*** 46.4347*** 44.4326***
(7.2030) (7.6368) (8.3208)
1.1291** 1.1183** 0.9836**
(0.4995) (0.4925) (0.4589)
14.3079 14.3235 17.1825**
(2,368.6676) (2,284.4102) (7.3763)
0.2301*** 0.2137*** 0.1769***
(0.0585) (0.0585) (0.0587)
150 150 149
4 4 4
puted from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) in relation to
276 WORLD DEVELOPMENTwhether they have improved livestock, use modern agricultural
inputs, farm other new crops, use irrigation, water holes,
improved seeds and/or fertilizer, whether they were selected
as model farmers, participated in soil conservation, or rain har-
vesting programs. If their responses are aﬃrmative a score of 1
is given for each of these innovations; if not, they get a score of
0. The simple sum of these scores provides an index of innova-
tion. For example, a farm household that adopted all the
twelve innovations will have a score of twelve and a household
that has not adopted any will have a score of zero. 14
Households on average have adopted around four of the
innovations (mean = 3.75) and at least one innovation has
been adopted by all households with the most innovative
households implementing eight (look at the ﬁgures under (1)
ERHS in Table 4).
Community level social money burning rates (MBRhv
v ) are
computed in the following way. For each individual the aver-
age money burning rates of all other individuals (i.e., excluding
the individual’s money burning rate) in the village is computed.
Social eﬀects should reﬂect what each individual expects on the
average from the rest of the people in the village.
To estimate Eqn. (1) the innovation index is regressed on
individual and social money burning rates and the interaction
between the two in addition to other controls. The regressions
are estimated using multi-level mixed eﬀects models with
survey site and session level random eﬀects to control forTable 6. Innovations (fertilizer, improved seeds, and rain harvesting) and mon
Investment rates on lottery game 0.
(0
Money burning rate from safe money 2
(1
Money burning rate from lottery win 
(0
Safe money social burning rate for PA 61
(2
Lottery win social burning rate for PA 89
(1
Individual*social money burning rates (safe money)
Individual* social money burning rates (lottery win)
Male (dummy)
Age (log)
No education (dummy)
Constant 14.
(2
Study site var(_cons) 2
(1
Session var(_cons) 
(8
Var(Residual) 0
(0
Observations
Number of groups
Note: The dependent variable in these regressions is the innovation index comp
errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.unobservable eﬀects at those levels. The same model is esti-
mated by including diﬀerent variables to see if results are
robust to inclusion and exclusion of variables.
In most cases, individual money burning rates – both from
safe money and lottery wins – are not signiﬁcant. In the three
cases they become signiﬁcant, they have the opposite sign to
our initial expectation. There is no robust correlation between
the individual money burning rates and their investment in
real agricultural innovations.
The highly signiﬁcant, consistent, and robust result from the
regressions reported in Table 5 is related to social money burn-
ing rates for both safe money and lottery winnings. For both
variables and for all speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients on the
social money burning rates are highly signiﬁcant and as
expected negative. The results strongly suggest that money
burning in the experimental games likely captures an impor-
tant aspect of social preference which is inimical to agricul-
tural innovations particularly on the community level. In
communities where the money burning rate is high, famers
innovate signiﬁcantly less. On the other hand, the interactive
terms between individual and social money burning are not
signiﬁcant (only one being signiﬁcant merely at 10% level).
This result suggests there is no strong feedback (externality)
eﬀect in money burning behavior.
Note that the detailed information on agricultural innova-
tions used so far comes from the ERHS, a survey that wasey burning: Multi-level regressions (site and session levels random eﬀects)
(1) (2) (3)
6957** 0.6593* 0.4121
.3408) (0.3424) (0.3439)
.1188** 9.5834 12.7837
.0207) (11.7617) (11.2962)
0.4684 6.7307 7.5390
.8341) (8.9468) (8.4291)
.2423*** 48.7662** 49.9196**
0.2190) (23.1956) (23.5538)
.8015*** 81.9200*** 72.7667***
7.3827) (19.6132) (19.9101)
150.6836 185.9199
(151.8993) (145.4998)
82.5129 94.4218
(101.1747) (95.2679)
0.5175***
(0.1252)
0.1764
(0.2084)
0.2093*
(0.1261)
2640*** 12.5871*** 10.9913***
.8276) (3.1176) (3.1988)
2.4458** 2.2344***
.3564** (1.1753) (0.7286)
.0002) 2.9982 24.3847***
3.3579 (4.2436) (9.1970)
.3410) 0.2182*** 0.2798***
.2145*** (0.0520) (0.0514)
.0520)
194 194 193
4 4 4
uted from the data set collected by the current research project. Standard
SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL CASE STUDY 277conducted independently of the current research. In the cur-
rent research project, data on agricultural innovations, partic-
ularly focusing on the use of fertilizer, improved seeds, and
rain harvesting, were collected. Similar to the above proce-
dure, we computed a simple innovation index capturing the
adoption of the three innovations by households; for each
innovation adopted by the households, a score of 1 is given
otherwise 0. Hence, households adopting all three will have
an innovation index of 3 and those who have not adopted
any will have a score of 0. The mean innovation index for
the sample is 1.37, meaning that on the average households
have adopted less than two innovations. Around a ﬁfth of
the sampled households have not adopted any one of the three
(ﬁgures under ‘(2) Money burning project’ in Table 4).
As in the previous case, this new innovation index is
regressed on individual and social money burning rates and
their interaction in addition to some control variables.
Multi-level mixed models with site and session levels random
eﬀects are estimated (look at Table 6).
Like in the previous case, individual money burning rates
are not signiﬁcantly correlated to the innovation index. All
the social money burning rates for both safe money and lot-
tery winnings on the other hand are highly signiﬁcant and neg-
ative. The results from the previous regressions are conﬁrmed.
As indicated before, since the ERHS and the current project
generated these data sets independently, one can be more
conﬁdent on this robust result. Social money burning on theTable 7. Speciﬁc innovations and money b
Variables (1) (2)
Fertilizer Improved s
Investment rates on lottery game 0.7168 1.8672**
(0.7423) (0.6326
Money burning rate from safe money 1.7007 15.4791
(38.5041) (20.8804
Money burning rate from lottery win 19.3796 15.4288
(27.2593) (16.5533
Safe money social burning rate for PA 6.0111 78.9846
(59.3255) (40.0564
Lottery win social burning rate for PA 128.4483*** 67.9062
(41.0269) (34.4172
Individual*social m. burning rates (safe money) 26.8987 244.970
(509.6125) (267.598
Individual* social m. burning rates (lottery win) 232.5595 173.037
(295.6409) (186.259
Male (dummy)
Age (log)
No education (dummy)
Constant 12.9974* 11.9547*
(6.6510) (5.4718
var(_cons[site]) 0.0441 0.0000
(0.0702) (0.0000
var(_cons[site>session]) 0.0000 0.0584
(0.0000) (0.0764
Observations 194 194
Number of groups 4 4
Note: The dependent variable in these regressions is a dummy variable represen
current research project. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.community level is robustly and negatively correlated to agri-
cultural innovation as illustrated from the results of the two
independent data sets. As in the previous case, the interaction
terms between individual and social money burning rates are
not signiﬁcant.
Result 6. Higher social money burning rates at the village
level are negatively and robustly correlated to agricultural
innovations measured by indices based on the ERHS as
well as data collected by the current research. This implies
that the money burning behavior captured in the experi-
mental games captures social preferences that are inimical
to real-life agricultural innovations.
So far, indices that capture the overall number of innova-
tions from two independent data sets are used as measures
of agricultural innovations. An alternative is to look at indi-
vidual innovations. In Table 7, regression results from multi-
level probit models using speciﬁc innovations (fertilizer,
improved seeds, and rain harvesting) are presented. The
results from these probits generally support the results from
innovation indices. In all speciﬁcations, individual money
burning from safe money as well as from lottery winnings is
not signiﬁcantly correlated to the speciﬁc innovations. Similar
to the previous results, most of the coeﬃcients on the social
money burning rates from safe money and lottery wins are
negative and signiﬁcant. From the twelve coeﬃcients seven
are highly signiﬁcant and negative; in all the twelve cases coef-
ﬁcients are consistently negative. It is interesting to note thaturning: Multi-level probit regressions
(3) (4) (5) (6)
eeds Rain harvesting Fertilizer Improved seeds Rain harvesting
* 0.4564 0.3924 1.7913** 0.8087
) (0.7904) (0.8826) (0.7104) (0.8702)
20.1726 6.9161 29.5874 25.3777
) (24.1502) (43.1485) (23.3745) (25.1445)
3.3495 20.8923 20.7466 4.3190
) (22.3195) (29.6692) (18.1861) (22.8312)
** 43.0317 9.9455 87.8358* 42.2550
) (39.9752) (71.7952) (47.3210) (41.0427)
** 126.7073** 132.2366*** 55.0200 135.4135***
) (49.5069) (50.9432) (40.1073) (52.3205)
9 301.8285 89.7684 414.7643 367.0172
7) (314.7038) (570.6215) (298.3167) (326.8493)
7 34.7478 254.4901 239.3083 40.0589
8) (261.3861) (320.1827) (204.2425) (267.3850)
0.7473** 1.1305*** 0.0424
(0.3313) (0.2488) (0.3053)
0.7745 0.3450 0.4131
(0.4853) (0.3811) (0.4934)
0.5729* 0.2820 0.1163
(0.3036) (0.2335) (0.2948)
* 13.7894** 10.7096 9.5303 16.2208**
) (6.7375) (8.3843) (6.4720) (7.2627)
0.0000 0.0907 0.0549 0.0000
) (0.0000) (0.1270) (0.0715) (0.0000)
0.0000 0.0121 0.0000 0.0000
) (0.0000) (0.1116) (0.0000) (0.0000)
194 193 193 193
4 4 4 4
ting adoption of the given innovation based on the data set collected by the
278 WORLD DEVELOPMENTall but one of the coeﬃcients on social money burning from
lottery wins are signiﬁcant. The weight of the evidence in this
section clearly shows a strong and robust negative correlation
between social money burning rates and agricultural innova-
tions. Some of the evidence for this is derived using data that
were collected by another survey independently of the current
research; hence, this provides strong support to the results.
Contrary to our expectation, individual money burning rates
are not signiﬁcantly correlated to innovation activities. In
addition, the interaction between individual and social money
burning behavior does not create an external feedback eﬀect.
As indicated before, sociological reports were prepared by
university lecturers and eight focus group discussions were
conducted as part of this research in addition to the experi-
mental game. The qualitative data from these sources strongly
suggest behavior similar to money burning in real-life activi-
ties. For example, envy is considered by most as an automatic
consequence of success and achievement, as illustrated by the
farmer’s quote in the introduction. The sociological reports
provide stories of destructive behavior even among close fam-
ily members. 15
In this paper we focused on agricultural innovations; but note
that farmers are also involved in non-agricultural innovations.
In the long-term, since dependence on agriculture is expected to
decline with economic growth, non-agricultural innovations
are expected to become more important. Some of the anecdotal
evidence from the qualitative data indicates that sabotaging
behavior becomes even stronger in relation to activities that
are very diﬀerent from farming. Extension agents indicate that
the problem is stronger when innovations are very novel
(Tiumelissan, 2009). Since this research focused only on agri-
cultural innovations, the problem is likely to be more severe if
non-agricultural innovations are considered. At a general level,
growth of non-agricultural sectors is crucial in the structuraltransformation of economies and sabotaging (and fear of
sabotaging) can become an important obstacle to development.4. CONCLUSION
We presented an experiment on money burning primarily
run with Ethiopian farmers. Money burning rates were lower
than observed without the social pressures of the ﬁeld environ-
ment. While the data support the inequality aversion model of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), there is no evidence for the alterna-
tive inequality aversion model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
Reciprocal/retaliatory motives do not play an important role
in our experiment. Furthermore, money burning, particularly
money burning on the level of communities, is robustly and
negatively correlated to agricultural innovations. To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that captures money burning
behavior using experimental games and examines their eﬀect
on real-life innovations.
There are three take home messages for policy makers from
this research. First, sabotaging behavior proxied in this
research by money burning matters for adoption, even when
controlling for a number of other variables. Second, while
changing preferences may be diﬃcult, there may be institu-
tional changes that can be made to help channel such prefer-
ences in a productive rather than a destructive direction, as
argued by Grolleau, Mzoughi, and Sutan (2009). Third, the
negative eﬀect may be minimized if innovations are adopted
by signiﬁcantly large number of people in the community at
early stages. The usual model of small number of adopters fol-
lowed by the majority later may not be eﬀective; a ‘big push’ of
innovation may be required to break a sort of low equilibrium
trap created by the fear of sabotaging activities. Obviously fur-
ther research is needed.NOTES1. In the same spirit, the book by Bowles and Herbert (2011) is titled ‘A
cooperative species’ and focuses on pro-social behavior.
2. We are grateful to one of the reviewers for suggesting these references.
3. Birr is the national currency of Ethiopia. At the time of the games,
US$1 was worth around Birr 8.
4. This random dictator design follows Zizzo (2003). Note that, if the
money burning decisions of all the participants are implemented,
potentially the money to be burnt could be more than the money given
to players.
5. The scripts of instructions for the variable and ﬁxed groups are
provided in an Online Appendix.
6. For the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model it does not matter how the
money burning is spread across the other players as long as the ratio is
improved toward the average payoﬀ of the other players. This is why, by
having both a subject-speciﬁc payoﬀ diﬀerence and a ratio variable based
on the average payoﬀ of the other players as independent variables in a
regression analysis, we will be able to respectively identify a Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) or a Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model eﬀect.
7. The logic for making a distinction between safe and lottery winnings is
based on the fact that safe money is kept without any risk but lottery
money is earned after going for a risky undertaking.8. Here and below in this section, we consider our tests at the level of
independent observations: this means the session in the case of variable
groups, and the group in the case of ﬁxed groups. For example, in this
Mann–Whitney test, n = 10 for the ﬁxed groups and n = 2 for the
variable group sessions. The regression analysis will employ the data more
eﬃciently while controlling for the potential non independence of
observations. P values in this paper are two-sided throughout.
9. To assess whether the income of the money burner would be
signiﬁcant in the absence of multicollinearity, we did the following. The
variance inﬂation factor (VIF) for total income of the money burner in the
regression reported in column (4) is 4.45; the square root of the VIF (2.11)
indicates by how much the standard error is inﬂated due to multicollin-
earity. If the standard error of the coeﬃcient is divided by the square root
of the VIF, we get 0.0005 which is an estimation of what would be the
standard error if there was no multicollinearity. With this standard error
the income of the money burner would have become signiﬁcant. This is
additional evidence reinforcing our claim that the income ratio is partly
capturing an income eﬀect.
10. The ERHS is a panel household survey which has been conducted in
15 rural villages starting from 1994 in all important agro-ecological
regions of the country. This paper uses the data from the round conducted
in 2004; previous rounds were run in 1994, 1995, 1997, and 1999.
11. Here we are focusing on social preferences measured from our
experimental games but are not discounting the very wide literature on
agricultural innovations.
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underlying inequality aversion but it is also possible that the burning
speciﬁcally of money obtained after going for a risky undertaking may be
a better proxy for the discouragement of real-world innovations. Because
of this we distinguish between money burning rate out of safe money and
money burning out of lottery winnings.
13. Chat (Catha edulis) is a mildly intoxicating plant that is consumed
widely both in Ethiopia as well as neighboring countries. It has become an
important source of income for farmers as well as a major foreign
exchange earner for the country.14. Obviously, this innovation index is a very rough measure. Among its
other limitations, it does not take into account substitutability and
complementarity between the diﬀerent innovations.
15. In Imdibir, one of the study villages, a man is reported to have set ﬁre
to his brother’s farm when his brother started cultivating a more proﬁtable
cereal.
16. Enset (Ensete ventricosum) is the false banana tree and is used as
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SITES
The key data for this research are gathered from four vil-
lages. The villages were covered in a previous panel household
survey which provides detailed data going as far back as 1994.
One of the villages, Imdibir, is located southwest of the capital
Addis Ababa in the Gurage region, a region in the heartland
of a farming system based on enset 16 that is characterized
280 WORLD DEVELOPMENTby the use of the hoe rather than the ox-plough. The majority
of the people are members of the Gurage, a highly entrepre-
neurial ethnic group active in commerce. The second, village
Aze Deboa, is in the Kembata region, dominated by an ethnic
group of the same name. Even though enset is important, cere-
als and other crops play a more prominent role compared to
Imdibir. The third village, Terufe Kechema is near one of
the biggest commercial centers in the south, the town of Shas-
hemene. The region is dominated by the Oromo, the most
populous ethnic group in Ethiopia. The fourth village, Yet-
men, is located northwest of Addis Ababa and like most
regions in the north farming is dominated by the cultivation
of cereals and use of the ox plough. Yetmen and the surround-
ing area are well known for the production of teﬀ, a type of
cereal used for human consumption only in Ethiopia. The
strong demand for teﬀ has made the region relatively prosper-
ous. As the short description above indicates, important ethnic
and farming system diﬀerences are captured by these villages.
Two of the most populous ethnic groups in Ethiopia – Oromo
and Amhara – are the dominant ethnic groups in the two sites,
Terufe Kechema and Yetmen, respectively. Similarly, the vil-
lages also capture important variations in agricultural systems:
the ox-plough versus hoe-culture, enset versus cereals. The
spread of agricultural innovations is also varied; for example,
the percentages of farmers using fertilizer range from a low of
45% in Imdibir to a high of 97% in Yetmen.
Even though the main data came from the money burning
experimental game, additional information was also gathered.
Pre-game questionnaires capture background information on
participants, agricultural practices, and innovations. Post-
game questionnaires gathered information on the players’
experience of the game. While the above-mentioned research
instruments were administered on individuals participating
in the game, additional information was also gathered through
focus group discussions and sociological surveys. In each vil-
lage, four focus groups – two with males and two with females
– were organized. Four sociology lecturers from Addis Ababa
University were commissioned to write sociological reports on
each village using both gray literature and ﬁeld visits where
key informant interviews, local materials, folklores, anecdotal
evidences, and similar information were gathered.
The rural ﬁeldwork was conducted in February–March
2009. Due to low mobility/migration in rural Ethiopia, track-
ing households that were interviewed in the last round of the
rural household survey in 2004 was not too diﬃcult. While60 individuals were required for the two sessions of the game
in each village, the household survey covered more than that
in each village. Some individuals (33 out of 240, i.e., 14%)
did not turn up at the time of the game and had to be replaced
by others not originally covered by the household survey.
The games were also played with 120 Addis Ababa Univer-
sity students in February 2010. The students were mainly at
the undergraduate level and from the Education and Business
and Economics faculties. While two sessions at Addis Ababa
University are identical to the rural ones, two sessions with
ﬁxed groups of players were also conducted; this was done
to examine the eﬀect of playing with the same individuals in
the three stages on money burning behavior as well as increase
the number of independent observations and improve statisti-
cal power.
In three villages, halls that accommodate players sitting rea-
sonably far apart were used; in the remaining one village the
game was played in two big tents. In Addis Ababa, a very
big hall that can accommodate a large number of people
was used. Research assistants were intensively trained and
one of the authors of this paper oversaw the conduct of all
the experimental sessions.
In all cases, participants came to the designated place so that
we had a more controlled environment compared to playing
the games sequentially at diﬀerent times and places like the
homes of players. But signiﬁcant diﬀerences with experimental
game laboratories in Western universities should be noted. In
the rural areas all individuals are drawn from the same village.
Even though players could not identify who their group mem-
bers are, each participant sees the remaining 29 players most
or all of whom are likely to be known to him/her. Similarly,
university students were drawn from a small number of facul-
ties and hence are likely to know each other. This is diﬀerent
from complete anonymity in proper experimental labs where
individuals interact through computer terminals. The lack of
complete anonymity likely increases pro-social behavior, and
so we believe the money burning rates are likely to be biased
downward.APPENDIX B. SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.worlddev.2014.10.022.ScienceDirect
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